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NORTH CAROLINA'S DEVELOPING PUBLIC
POLICY WRONGFUL DISCHARGE DOCTRINE IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM: BASIC PRINCIPLES,
CAUSATION & PROOF OF IMPROPER MOTIVE
J.

MICHAEL McGUINNESS

1

The courts will be very derelict in their duty if they do not enforce
justice in favor of employees as well as the public.2
[1In a civilized state where reciprocal rights and duties abound the
An
words "at will" can never mean "without limit or qualification".
anarchy,
at will prerogative without limits could be suffered only in an
and not there for long-it certainly cannot be suffered in a society such
as ours without weakening the bond of counter balancing rights and
[T]here can be no
obligations that hold such societies together ....
right to terminate [an employment] contract for an unlawful reason or
purpose that contravenes public policy.3
I.

NORTH CAROLINA'S PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE

Through a plethora of state statutes, regulations, and cases, North
Carolina enjoys an extensive body of employment law. Traditionally,
employment and labor relations were predominately governed by federal law. Although federal law still in part governs many employment
1. B.A. cum laude, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, J.D., North
Carolina Central; post-graduate study, National Law Center, George Washington
University. Member, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and District of Columbia Bars.
Mr. McGuinness practices employment law, civil rights law, and law enforcement
liability law from his offices in Elizabethtown, North Carolina and Washington, D.C.
Mr. McGuinness has litigated a number of public policy wrongful discharge cases and
authored amicus curiae briefs in the Coman and Amos cases before the North Carolina
Supreme Court. His e-mail address is: jmichael@mcguinnesslaw.com Copyright
2001. All rights reserved.
This article is dedicated to John C. Midgette, Executive Director of the North Carolina
Police Benevolent Association. Mr. Midgette has successfully advocated public policy
claims on behalf of North Carolina law enforcement officers for more than a decade.
2. Greenlee v. Southern Ry., 122 N.C. 977, 981, 30 S.E. 115, 116 (1898).
3. Sides v. Duke Hospital, 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E. 2d 818, 826 (1985),
adopted in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445,
447 (1989).
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relationships in North Carolina,4 recent changes in North Carolina law
have enhanced the importance of state law in North Carolina employment relationships.
In addition to numerous sources of state statutory protection for
North Carolina's workforce,5 the common law public policy wrongful
discharge doctrine continues to serve as a meaningful potential catch4. For example, many federal statutes have a minimum threshold number of
employees for application of a federal standard, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, which provides that the Title VII scheme applies to
employers with a minimum of fifteen employees.
5. Examples of DISCRIMINATION/RETALIATION STATUES:
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-28.1 (1999) (Prohibits employment discrimination
against persons with sickle cell trait or hemoglobin C trait);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.1 (1999) (Statement of public policy, without
remedial provisions, promoting equal employment opportunity without
regard to race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex or disability);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A (1999) (Prohibits discrimination against disabled
persons in employment as well as other areas and provides for a civil cause of
action);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-148(i) (1999) (Prohibits discrimination in
employment against persons with AIDS or who test positive for the HIV
virus);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-214 (1999) Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act
(Prohibits retaliation and discrimination against employees who make
complaints and file claims with certain state agencies);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-84 (1999) (Prohibits retaliation against state employee
whistleblowers).
Examples of WAGES/TERMS/CONDITIONS/BENEFITS OF EMPLOYMENT:
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25 et seq. (1999) (Establishes state minimum wage;
regulates employment of minors, hours of work, payment and withholding
wages);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-126 et seq. (1999) (Establishes certain occupational
safety and health standards and provides for enforcement);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § Ch. 96 (1999) (Establishes the Employment Security
Commission and regulates the payment of unemployment insurance
benefits);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § Ch. 97 (1999) (Regulates the payment of worker
compensation benefits to employees injured on the job).
Examples of PROTECTED CONDUCT AND PROTECTIONS AGAINST DISCHARGE:
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-230 et seq. (1999) (Establishes procedural requirements
for drug screenings performed by employers and other examiners to protect
against unreliable examinations);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-353 et seq. (1999) (Criminal laws relating to
employment, including prohibition against bribing employees, blacklisting
employees, and requiring employees to pay for a medical exam as a condition
of employment);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-420 et seq. (1999) (Prohibition against retaliatory action
against an employee who files a claim or complaint with regard to workers'
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all remedy for North Carolina employees when an employer's conduct
is potentially
contravenes established public policy. This doctrine
6
applicable to a broad range of employer conduct.
This article reviews the recent state and federal cases construing
North Carolina's public policy wrongful discharge doctrine. The article also analyzes the most common practical problem that arises in
wrongful discharge cases: the causation issue. Finally, the article
compensation, wage and hour protections, occupational safety and health
standards, or mining safety and health standards);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-78 et seq. (1999) (North Carolina's "right-to-work" law
prohibiting adverse requiring licenses, forbidding certain contract provisions
and prohibiting kickbacks);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-47.1 et seq. (1999) (Regulates services that assist job
seekers in finding jobs, requiring licenses, forbidding certain contract
provisions and prohibiting kickbacks);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-438.1 et seq. (1999) (Creates a State Job Training
Coordinating Council to oversee the implementation of Job Training
Partnership Act program);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § Ch. 126 (1999) (Establishes a system of personnel
administration for state employees and certain local government employees,
which includes prohibitions against discrimination and discharge without
cause);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-271 et seq. (1999) (Regulates employment and
discharge of employees within the school system) (Teachers, 115C-295; other
employees, 115C-315);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 127A-201 et seq. (1999) (Requires restoration of an
honorably released member of the National Guard to the employee's previous
position or comparable position);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-28.2 (1999) (Prohibits discrimination against persons
using lawful products during non-work hours as long as use does not
adversely affect performance);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-196 (1999) (Protects employees from discharge for
assisting in Department of Labor investigations or testifying regarding
hazardous chemicals);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-32 (1999) (Protects jurors from discharge for missing
work due to jury duty).
6. Some have complained that "[w]hat began as a narrow erosion of the
employment-at-will doctrine is on the verge of becoming part of virtually every lawsuit
arising out of termination of employment" in violation of public policy. Andrew B.
Cohen, Wrongful Discharge and the North CarolinaEqual Employment PracticesAct: The
Localization of Federal DiscriminationLaw, 21 N.C. Cent. L.J. 54, 54 (1995). However,
subsequent cases have not borne out the fear that every discharge will invoke the
public policy exception. Rather, the North Carolina cases have expanded the doctrine
carefully on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Amos v. Oakdale Knitting, 331 N.C. 348,
416 S.E.2d 166, (1993) (the court stated: "we allow this still evolving area of the law to
mature slowly, deciding each case on the facts before us."). Id. at 351, 416 S.E.2d at
168, n.1.
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offers a framework of analysis and a multi-part test for assessing
improper motive, a difficult issue which arises in virtually all public
policy wrongful discharge cases.
A.

North Carolina'sSeminal Public Policy Case: Sides v. Duke
University
North Carolina's common law wrongful discharge doctrine was
born in 1985 in Sides v. Duke University.7 Sides was a nurse who allegedly was fired for refusing to commit perjury at the request of her
superiors. 8 In Sides, the North Carolina Court of Appeals observed
that "other states have recognized a common law cause of action in
tort for employees at will who are discharged for reasons that are in
some way wrongful or socially undesirable."9 Sides enunciated a wellgrounded rationale for recognition of a public policy wrongful discharge doctrine:
[I]n a civilized state where reciprocal rights and duties abound the
words "at will" can never mean "without limit or qualification".... An
at will prerogative without limits could be suffered only in an anarchy,
and there not for long-it certainly cannot be suffered in a society such
as ours without weakening the bond of counter balancing rights and
obligations that hold such societies together ....

[Tihere can be no

right to terminate such [an employment] contract for an unlawful reason or purpose [if it] contravenes public policy.10
[T]he legislature is not at all adverse to the courts of this State entertaining actions based on a violation of policies that have been enacted
or otherwise established for the protection and benefit of the public.'1
Plaintiff Marie Sides filed a wrongful discharge action premised
upon the public policy doctrine against Duke University Hospital
[hereinafter "Duke"], two physicians, and the chief nurse anesthetist at
7. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E. 2d 818 (1985). See J. Michael McGuinness, The
Doctrine of Wrongful DischargeIn North Carolina:The Confusing Path From Sides to Guy
and the Need For Reform, 10 Campbell L. Rev. 217 (1988) (tracing the history of Sides
and other North Carolina employment law doctrine); J. Wilson Parker, The Uses of the
Past: The Surprising History of Terminable-at-Will Employment in North Carolina, 22
Wake Forest L. Rev. 167 (1987). By 1994, only a handful of states had no public
policy exception. Lex Larson, Unjust Dismissal § 6.01, at 6-3 (1994). Those states
without a public policy claim in the employment law context were Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, New York and Rhode Island. Id.
8. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 331-35, 328 S.E.2d at 818-22.
9. 74 N.C. App. at 340-41, 328 S.E.2d at 825 (emphasis added).
10. 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826. In Coman, 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381
S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989), this rationale was expressly adopted.
11. 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
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Duke.12 Sides also alleged claims for breach of contract and interference with contractual relations. 13 The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 14
Sides was employed by Duke as a nurse anesthetist in 1970.15
Plaintiff was assured by Duke that nurse anesthetists could only be discharged for incompetence.16 This termination policy was shared by
other Duke employees throughout Sides' eleven-year tenure at Duke.17
In 1980, the estate of a former Duke patient initiated a malpractice action against Duke and several other individuals, including doctors Harmel and Miller."8 In that case, the plaintiff allegedly suffered
brain damage due to the negligent administration of anesthetics by Dr.
Miller.' 9 When the patient came out of surgery, Sides was on duty and
Dr. Miller instructed Sides to administer certain anesthetics to the
patient.20 Sides refused to administer the anesthetics because she

believed the anesthetics would harm the patient. 2 ' Dr. Miller then
administered the anesthetics to the patient, who, as a result, suffered
permanent brain damage.22
Prior to having her deposition taken in the resulting malpractice
action, Sides was advised by several Duke physicians, attorneys, and
others that she should not testify to all that she had seen regarding the
patient's treatment at Duke. 23 Some of the doctors warned Sides that,
if she did, she "would be in trouble."24 Similar pressures had already
caused another nurse anesthetist to withhold information at her deposition. Despite the pressure to do otherwise, Sides testified fully and
truthfully at her deposition. 25 After the deposition, Duke physicians,
particularly doctors Harmel and Miller, adopted hostile attitudes
toward Sides. 26 Ultimately, a verdict was returned for the patient's
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 334-35, 328 S.E.2d at 822.
at 335, 328 S.E.2d at 822.
at 332, 328 S.E.2d at 820.
at 332-33, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
at 333, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
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Dr. Harmel believed that Sides had caused

Duke and the other defendants to lose the case.28 Concerned that her
candid and forthright testimony might result in retaliatory tactics by
the Hospital, Sides asked the chief nurse to advise her of any complaints about her work. 29 The chief nurse refused.3 °
After the conclusion of the malpractice trial, some Duke physicians displayed antagonistic attitudes toward Sides, and some refused
to work with her. Dr. Miller told other physicians that they "should
have nothing to do with her", and Dr. Harmel encouraged these hostilities, making the performance of Sides' duties almost impossible.3 1
Sides again asked the chief nurse to assist her with these problems and
was again refused.3 2 Sides was subsequently called into a meeting, was
advised that her job performance was poor, and was told that she had
and "abusive attitude".3 3 Sides asked for specific examples of how her
work performance was poor, but none were given.3 4 Later, the chief
35
nurse and Dr. Harmel met with Sides and discharged her.
In Sides, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's dismissal of Sides' claims, and proceded to set forth the public
policy wrongful discharge doctrine in North Carolina. The egregious
facts in Sides enabled the court of appeals to crack the at-will wall and
recognize the common law public policy claim. Sides provided the
foundation for the initial growth in the doctrine until the North Carolina Supreme Court first recognized the public policy doctrine in
Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.36 in 1989.
A commentator and author of the treatise entitled North Carolina
Employment Law has suggested that "Sides was remarkably
broad ....-

7 Subsequent cases have trimmed some of the breadth

from Sides and yet still afford meaningful protection for employees in
cases with clear public policy underpinnings.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 333-34, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
33. Id. Such subjective and conclusory assertions are common, and may be
evidence of improper motive. See, e.g., Rowe v. General Motors, 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.
1972); Warren v. Halstead, 802 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1987).
34. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
35. Id. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 822.
36. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445.
37. See C. Daniel Barrett, North Carolina Employment Law 5 (1998).
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Basic Principles of the Public Policy Doctrine

To state an actionable wrongful discharge claim under the North
Carolina public policy wrongful discharge doctrine, an employee must
demonstrate that he or she was discharged because he or she "performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do
something that public policy would condemn. ' 38 In Lorbacher v.
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh,9 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals concisely stated the rule: "A valid claim for wrongful discharge
exists when an at-will employee is discharged
for an unlawful reason
40
or in contravention of public policy.
The public policy doctrine potentially applies to three general categories of discharges. First, the refusal of an employee to commit an
unlawful act required or requested to be performed by an employer
provides a basis for a public policy claim. 4 1 The second category of
actionable discharges involves a termination of an employee due to the
employee's performance of an obligation.4 2 The third category of
actionable discharges involves employee terminations premised upon
the exercise of an employee's legal rights or privileges.4 3
In order to determine if there is an adequate public policy to support a wrongful discharge claim, a court may look to various alternative sources of public policy contained in federal or state
constitutional provisions, federal or state statutes, judicial decisions,4 4
38. Vandegraft v. Am. Brands Corp., 572 F. Supp. 496, 497 (D.N.H. 1983). See also
Harrison v. Edison Brothers, 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991); Amos v. Oakdale, 331 N.C.
348, 416 S.E. 2d 166 (1992); Hogan v. Forsyth County Club, 79 N.C. App. 483, 340
S.E. 2d 116 (1986); Henry H. Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice § 7.1 (4th
ed. 1998).
39. 127 N.C. App. 663, 493 S.E.2d 74 (1997). Professor Perritt states the four
elements as follows: 1) the existence of a clear and substantial public policy, 2)
jeopardy to that public policy, 3) actual conduct by the employee that promotes the
policy, 4) the employer lacks a legitimate interest to justify the dismissal. Perritt, supra
note 38, § 7.1, at 4 (4th ed. 1998).
40. 127 N.C.App. at 672, 493 S.E.2d at 79.
41. Lex Larsen, Unjust Dismissal § 6.02, at 6-8 (1994); Perritt, supra note 38,
§ 7.25, at 70 (4th ed. 1998).
42. See Sides, 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818; Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91
N.C. App. 35, 370 S.E.2d 423 (1988); Larsen, supra note 33, § 6.04[1], at 6-11.
43. Larsen, supra note 41, § 6.04[2], at 6-14. See also J. Michael McGuinness, The
Doctrine of Wrongful Discharge in North Carolina, 10 Campbell L. Rev. 217, 229-30
(1988).
44. "Judicial decisions have been recognized as legitimate sources of public
policy .... " Larsen, supra note 41, § 6.05, at 6-22.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2001

7

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
210

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:203

administrative codes 45 and regulations, 4 6 and other defined public policies and laws.4 7 "Public policy at a given time finds expression in the
Constitution, the statutory law and in judicial decisions. ' 48 As long as
the public policy in issue is clear, the underlying source of it, whether
it be legislation, administrative rules, regulations, judicial decisions,
constitutional provisions, and even professional codes of ethics, have
been held to contain sufficient expressions of public policy. This fact
was evidenced in Sides, in which the court articulated the principle
that enforceable public policies include "policies that have been
enacted or otherwise established for the protection and benefit of the
public."4

9

Courts of other states have followed similar principles in the
employment law context. For example, in Payne v. Rozendaal, ° the
Vermont Supreme Court recognized that age discrimination violated
public policy even though it was not expressly included within Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act. The court explained:
Sometimes.. . public policy is declared by Constitution; sometimes by
statute; sometimes by judicial decision. More often, however, it abides
only in the customs and conventions of the people-in their clear consciousness and conviction of what is naturally and inherently just and
right ....5

Once a valid public policy has been recognized by the court, the
only remaining element that must be demonstrated by a plaintiff
employee in a public policy wrongful discharge claim is a causal connection between the employer's subversion of the recognized public
policy and the adverse action taken against the employee.
C.

Sides' Progeny

Post-Sides cases have fleshed out North Carolina's public policy
wrongful discharge doctrine, a doctrine which has become a signifi45. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho, 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980); Larsen, supra note 41,
§ 6.05, at 6-22.

46. "Administrative rules and regulations" have been "recognized as legitimate
sources of public policy .... Larsen, supra note 41, § 6.05, at 6-22.
47. See J. Michael McGuinness, The Doctrine of Wrongful Discharge in North

Carolina, 10 Campbell L. Rev. 217, 232-34 (1988) (reviewing alternative sources of
public policy; relied on by the court in Coman); Larsen, supra note 41, § 6.05, at 6-18.
48. Henningsen v. Bloomfield, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960). But cf. Johnson v. Mayo

Yarns, 126 N.C. App. 292, 484 S.E.2d 840 (1997) (see analysis infra).
49. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 824 (emphasis added). This clearly
connotes that non-statutory public policies are actionable.

50. 520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986).
51. Id. at 588.
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cant aspect of North Carolina employment law. In Walker v. Westing-

house Electric Corporation, 2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
characterized Sides as "a major exception to the general rule that an
indefinite contract of employment is terminable at will", and that an
"employer's power to terminate 'at will' cannot be absolute, in view of
the many other societal obligations shared by employers and employees." 5 3 However, subsequent cases have shifted the characterization of
the public policy wrongful discharge doctrine from that of a "major
exception" to a more narrow exception to the general rule of at-will
employment, despite the fact that "public policy" continues to be
broadly defined.5 4
1.

Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.: The North Carolina
Supreme Court Affirms Sides

In 1989, in the case of Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co. ,55 the
North Carolina Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, a public
policy wrongful discharge claim. The holding and rationale of Sides v.
Duke University was expressly adopted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Coman.5 6 In Coman, the plaintiff employee was fired for
refusing to drive a commercial truck in violation of federal and state
regulations.5 7 The plaintiff truck driver alleged that his employer
required him to falsify his log books to show purported compliance
with law. 58 The plaintiff was a long-distance truck driver employed to
transfer goods in his employer's vehicles throughout the country.5 9
The employer's driving operations were governed by federal regulations and state law. 6' The pertinent regulations provided that a driver
could not drive a vehicle for more than a ten-hour shift, and further
provided that driving shifts be followed by at least eight hours of
52. 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985) (emphasis added). Cf. McLaughlin v.
Barclays, 95 N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836 (1989) (rejecting application of public
policy doctrine to self defense); Burrow v. Westinghouse, 88 N.C. App. 347, 363
S.E.2d 215 (1988) (rejecting public policy doctrine for an employee's refusal to drive
under unsafe conditions).
53. 77 N.C. App. at 262, 335 S.E.2d at 85.
54. See Boesche v. Raleigh Durham Airport Authority, 111 N.C. App. 149, 432
S.E.2d 137 (1993) (in which the court stated: "Sides and Coman have only narrowly
eroded the employment-at-will doctrine."). Id. at 152-153, 432 S.E.2d at 139-140.
55. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 173-74, 381 S.E.2d at 446.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 173, 381 S.E.2d at 445.
60. Id. at 173, 381 S.E.2d at 446.
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rest.61 The regulations also required a driver to maintain accurate logs
of all travel.6 2 The employer required Coman to violate these regulations by requiring Coman to drive for periods of time in excess of that
allowed by the regulations.6 3 Coman was also instructed that he
would have to falsify his travel logs in order to demonstrate apparent
compliance with the regulations.6 4 When Coman refused to violate
the regulations in this manner, he was informed that his pay would be
65
reduced by at least fifty percent.
The general issue before the court was whether the North Carolina
Supreme Court should adopt
a public policy exception to the general
66
rule of at-will employment.
Defining public policy as "the principle of law which holds that
no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to
the public or against the public good",6 7 Coman expressly adopted the
central reasoning from Sides. 68 The court reasoned that although "perjury and subornation of perjury differ from operating a truck in violation of law and falsifying federal records", the employer's conduct
similarly offended the public policy of North Carolina. 6 9 This demonstrated that the public policy wrongful discharge doctrine was not limited to the narrow perjury-specific set of facts in Sides. In Coman, the
court observed that the employer's conduct violated federal Department of Transportation regulations, but also violated the public policy
of North Carolina contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-384 and 20-397.7 0
The court stated: "[I]t is the public policy in this jurisdiction that the
safety of persons and property on or near the public highways be
protected."'"
Post-Coman cases on the North Carolina Supreme Court level, further circumscribing the boundaries of the public policy wrongful discharge doctrine, have shown some restrictive interpretations of the
North Carolina public policy wrongful discharge doctrine. In Burgess
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 173-74, 381 S.E.2d at 446.
66. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
67. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2.
68. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
69. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (citing Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735, 92 S.E.2d
182 (1956)).
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v. Your House of Raleigh,7 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court observed
that North Carolina's at-will employment doctrine has "been narrowly
eroded by statutory and public policy limitations on its scope. ' 73 In
Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, 4 the North Carolina
Supreme Court observed in dicta that exceptions to North Carolina's
at-will employment doctrine "should be adopted only with substantial
justification grounded in compelling considerations of public policy."' 75 However, a number of appellate and other North Carolina cases

addressing the public policy wrongful discharge doctrine have not
applied the potential import of this general limiting language.
For example, in Battle v. Perdue,76 Judge Boyle of the Eastern District of North Carolina analyzed Coman and the North Carolina public
policy wrongful discharge doctrine. In Battle, the court recognized the
common law public policy claim in a disability discrimination suit and
reasoned: "The court [in Coman] broadly defined public policy as the
principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good. 7 7
2.

Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co.

In 1993, the North Carolina Supreme Court again revisited the
public policy wrongful discharge doctrine. In Amos v. Oakdale Knitting
Co., 78 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed a public policy

wrongful discharge case involving an employer's decision to terminate
an employee for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum
wage. Three issues were presented: first, whether terminating an
72. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
73. Id. at 210, 388 S.E.2d at 137 (emphasis added).
74. 347 N.C. 329, 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997).
75. Id. at 334, 493 S.E.2d at 423. In Regan v. Westpoint Stevens Inc., 139 F.3d
892, 1998 WL 112725 at *1-2 (4th Cir. March 16, 1998) (per curiam), the Fourth
Circuit rejected a plaintiff employee's alleged public policy claim because plaintiff did
not identify any established public policy that his termination allegedly contravened.
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit observed that "North Carolina law provides several

public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will rule." Among other examples that
the Fourth Circuit listed was when "an employee may not be terminated for refusing to
obey the law." Id.
76. No. 91-68-CIV-2-BO (E.D.N.C. May 28, 1992).
77. Battle at 5 (quoting Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2).
78. 331 N.C. 348, 416 S.E.2d 166 (1993). While Amos reaffirmed and expanded
the public policy doctrine, the Court also found that Coman had not recognized an
independent bad faith wrongful discharge doctrine. Amos observed that Coman's bad
faith analysis was merely dicta. After Amos, although bad faith is certainly a
consideration, it does not constitute a separate cause of action.
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employee for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum
wage violated North Carolina public policy and therefore afforded a
cause of action for wrongful discharge; second, whether the availability
of alternative remedies prevents a plaintiff employee from enjoying a
common law wrongful discharge claim; and third, whether Coman v.
Thomas Manufacturing Co. recognized a separate "bad faith" wrongful
discharge claim.

79

The court provided direct answers to these compelling issues.
First, Amos did, in fact, state a valid public policy wrongful discharge
claim for being terminated for refusing to work for less than the minimum wage. Second, absent express preemption, the availability of
alternative federal and state remedies does not prevent a plaintiff from
enjoying a common law wrongful discharge claim. Finally, Coman did
not provide a separate and distinct "bad faith" exception to the employ80
ment-at-will doctrine.
In Amos, the plaintiff employees learned that their salary had been
reduced to $2.18 per hour, which was below the statutorily-prescribed
minimum wage contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.3.81

The

employer informed plaintiffs that they either had to work for the
reduced pay or they would be terminated. 2 Plaintiffs refused and
were fired. 8 3
In Amos, the court expressly rejected making any further definition of public policy:
Although it may be tempting to refine the definition of 'public policy'
in order to formulate a more precise and exact definition, we decline to
do so. Any attempt to make the definition more precise would inevitably lead to at least as many questions as answers. True to the common
law tradition, we allow this still evolving area of the law to mature
84
slowly, deciding each case on the facts before us.
Also particularly noteworthy because of its rejection of the preemption doctrine,8 5 Amos expressly held that the North Carolina public policy wrongful discharge doctrine is not limited to situations in
79. Id. at 350, 416 S.E.2d at 168.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. 331 N.C. at 353, 416 S.E.2d at 170 n.1. In Coman, the Court had defined
public policy as the principle of law holding that no citizen can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. 325 N.C. at
175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2. See also McLaughlin v. Barclays, 95 N.C. App. 301, 305,

382 S.E.2d 839, 839 (1989).
85. Amos, 331 N.C. at 356, 416 S.E.2d at 171.
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which the employee has no other available remedy.8 6 In Amos, the
plaintiffs could have initiated claims under the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act.8 7 The court, however,
held that this did not "automatically preclude a claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception .... "88
Amos reasoned that "[t]he public policy exception adopted by this
Court in Coman is not just a remedial gap-filler. It is ... designed to
vindicate the rights of employees fired for reasons offensive to the public policy of this State."'8 9 This breadth of language and the holding in
Amos have provided fertile ground for the public policy doctrine to
gradually develop through the 1990's. The concerns of possible floodgates of public policy litigation has not materialized.
3.

Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc.

The Sides, Coman, and Amos trilogy provided the public policy
wrongful discharge foundation until 1999, when the North Carolina
Supreme Court again directly revisited the public policy wrongful discharge doctrine. 9 ° In Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc.,9' the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that an employee discharge which
was in violation of a controlled substance examination regulation did
not constitute an actionable claim under the public policy wrongful
92
discharge doctrine.
The issue before the court in Garnerwas whether the termination
of plaintiffs employment premised upon a positive drug test constitutes a wrongful discharge when the drug test was not performed in
compliance with a state statute. 9 3 The plaintiff employee was administered a drug test and the plaintiffs sample tested positive for the presence of marijuana. 94 Consequently, plaintiff was terminated.9 5
(Plaintiff denied using any illegal drugs.)96 Plaintiff brought an action
against his employer, contending that his discharge was wrongful in
that the defendant employer, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-232,
86. 331 N.C. at 356-57, 416 S.E.2d at 171.
87. Id. at 357, 416 S.E.2d at 171-72.
88. Id. at 356, 416 S.E.2d at 171.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
350 N.C. 567, 515 S.E.2d 438 (1999).
Id.
Id.

93. Id. at 568, 515 S.E.2d at 439.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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failed to have the testing performed by an "approved laboratory" as
97
defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-231(1).

Having traced the history of North Carolina's public policy wrongful discharge doctrine beginning with Sides v. Duke University up
through the most recent cases, 98 the court concluded:
We agree that N.C.G.S. 95-230 is an expression of the public policy of
North Carolina. However, we do not agree with plaintiff that because
defendant violated N.C.G.S. 95-232 by failing to use an approved laboratory, the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
is automatically triggered, giving rise to a claim for wrongful discharge .... Under the rationale of Sides, Coman, and Amos, something

more than a mere statutory violation is required to sustain a claim of
wrongful discharge under the public-policy exception. An employer
wrongfully discharges an at-will employee if the termination is done
for "an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy." As
stated in Amos, the public-policy exception was "designed to vindicate
the rights of employees fired for reasons offensive to the public policy
of this State." 9 9

This language likely contemplates that a degree of improper intent
or willfulness on the part of the employer must be present before the
public policy wrongful discharge doctrine is triggered. In other words,
in order to support a claim for wrongful discharge, it appears that the
termination must be at least in part motivated by an unlawful reason
or purpose that is against public policy. 10 0 Presumably reasoning
along these lines, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to forecast any evidence that at the time of the plaintiffs testing the employer
knew or even suspected that the laboratory did not qualify as an
approved laboratory. 1 0 '
The import of Garner seems to be that because the employer was
not shown to have known of its violation of the statute requiring an
approved drug testing laboratory at the time of the violation, the
employer's actions could not be construed to be a knowing violation of
public policy. Thus, under Garner, a mere unintentional, technical
violation of a statute or public policy that is not causally connected to
the employee's termination will not suffice to constitute an actionable
claim.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 569-571, 515 S.E.2d at 439-440.
99. Id. at 571, 515 S.E.2d at 441 (quoting Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at
826; Amos, 331 N.C. at 356, 417 S.E.2d at 171) (citations omitted).
100. Garner, 350 N.C. at 572, 515 S.E.2d at 441.
101. Id.
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Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc.

In Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc.,102 the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the affirmance of an employee's verdict in a contract-based employment case. 10 3 Kurtzman did not involve
an arguable public policy claim, but contains dicta suggesting limitation of the recent erosion of the at-will employment doctrine.' °4
In Kurtzman, the defendant employer recruited the plaintiff to
work for the defendant and subsequently the parties negotiated the
terms of the employment.10 5 During the negotiations, plaintiff
inquired into the security of his proposed position with the defendant. 10 6 The employer's agents made the following representations to
the plaintiff: "if you do your job, you'll have a job"; "[t]his is a longterm growth opportunity for you"; "[t]his is a secure position"; and
"[w]e're offering you a career position."107
Plaintiff argued that the combination of the additional consideration of plaintiff moving his residence and defendant's specific assurances of continued employment removed the employment relationship
from the at-will presumption and created an employment contract
under which he could not be terminated without cause.'0 8 The court
overruled Sides in limited part regarding the contract based claim.1 0 9
Ruling for the defendant employer, the court observed in dicta
that the employment-at-will doctrine has prevailed in this state for a
century." 0 The court stated: "The narrow exceptions to it have been
grounded in considerations of public policy designed either to prohibit
status-based discrimination or to insure the integrity of the judicial
process or the enforcement of the law."1'1 1 The court further reasoned
that "[a] century later, the [at-will] rule remains an incentive to economic development, and any significant erosion of it could serve as a
disincentive. Additional exceptions thus demand careful considera102. 347 N.C. 329, 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997). Kurtzman overruled-in part-Sides on
the contract issues, but not on the public policy claim.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 333-45, 493 S.E.2d at 423-24.
105. Id. at 330, 493 S.E.2d at 421.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 421.
108. Id. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 421-22.
109. Id. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 422.
110. Id. at 333, 493 S.E.2d at 423. See also Edward v. Seaboard, 121 N.C. 490, 49192, 28 S.E. 137, 137 (1897).
111. Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333-34, 493 S.E.2d at 423. There are, however, several
North Carolina appellate cases which do not fit within Kurtzman's suggested
parameters.
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tion and should be adopted only with substantial justification
grounded in compelling considerations of public policy. 11 2 This reasoning suggests some limitations on the future of the public policy
wrongful discharge doctrine. However, the effect of this language
remains dubious because Kurtzman was not a public policy case.
5. Additional Post-Coman Decisions
A number of post-Coman decisions have afforded relief to discharged employees in alternative circumstances. In Lenzer v. Flaherty,'1 3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the
application of the public policy wrongful discharge doctrine when a
state employee was discharged because she reported abuses at an alcohol rehabilitation center.11 4 Lenzer recognized a classic whistleblower
theory. Lenzer is particularly noteworthy because the public policy
basis that the court relied upon was the employee's free speech rights
guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution. 115 Because of the
breadth of constitutional language, Lenzer's recognition of the use of
the North Carolina Constitution as a source of public policy substantially broadened the number of potentially actionable public policies.
In Deerman v. Beverly California Corporation,1 6 one of the more
instructive recent cases, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that
a nurse stated a valid claim for wrongful discharge under the public
policy doctrine. " 7 In Deerman, the plaintiff employee was a registered
nurse responsible for managing medical care and treatment for
patients at the defendant employer's facility. 18 The plaintiff encountered a patient who had begun to seriously deteriorate, was in acute
distress, and needed a change of treatment. 119 The plaintiff documented and reported all of the patient's medical difficulties to the
patient's physician and attempted to further communicate with the
physician in this regard, but the physician did not respond. 2 °
112. Id. at 334, 493 S.E.2d at 423.
113. 106 N.C. App. 496, 418 S.E.2d 276 (1992). See Brewington v. Bedsole, 1993
WL 819885 (May 14, 1993) (recognized common law wrongful discharge premised
upon "a state constitutional free speech violation.").
114. Id.
115. Id. at 514, 418 S.E.2d at 287.
116. 135 N.C. App. 1, 518 S.E.2d 804 (1999).
117. Id. at 2, 518 S.E.2d at 805.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Plaintiff was contacted by a member of the patient's family regarding the patient's difficulties and deteriorating condition. 1 2 1 Plaintiff
advised the patient's family as to her concerns, and one of the family
members asked the plaintiffs advice as to what should be done; the
plaintiff advised that she would reconsider the choice of physicians,
and that the appropriate treatment had not been provided. 12 2 After
being advised that the plaintiff had informed the patient's family that
they should reconsider their choice of physicians for the patient, the
employer terminated the plaintiff. The employer's stated basis for the
termination was "due to her advising the family of the patient that they
should consider changing physicians for the patient." 12 1324 The trial
court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(B)(6).
In Deerman, the court of appeals observed that "our courts have
enunciated no 'bright-line' test for determining if termination of an at"125 The public policy in issue
will employee violates public policy ....
1 26
and the administrative regulations
was the Nursing Practices Act
promulgated thereunder. 127 The court of appeals concluded that
"[t]he NPA and attendant administrative regulations thus evidence a
clear public policy in North Carolina to protect public safety and
health by maintaining minimum standards of nursing care." 128
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.20(4) defines "nursing" as "'a dynamic
discipline which includes the caring, counseling, teaching, referring
and implementing of prescribed treatment in the prevention and management of illness.. .- "129 The cited administrative regulations provide more specific detail as to the required functions of a registered
nurse.13o The statute and regulations imposed both requirements and
express prohibitions relevant to the plaintiffs cause of action.13 ' For
counseling
example, the regulations note that "'teaching and
' 13 2
include ... making referrals to appropriate resources."
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 3, 518 S.E.2d at 805.
124. Id. at 4, 518 S.E.2d at 806.
125. Id. (citing Teleflex Information Systems, Inc. v. Arnold, 132 N.C. App. 689,
691, 513 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1999)).
126. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-171.19-90-171.47 (2000).
127. 135 N.C. App at 6, 518 S.E.2d at 807.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 7, 518 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.20(4)).
130. Id. at 7, 518 S.E.2d at 808.
131. Id. at 8, 518 S.E.2d at 808.
132. Id. at 9, 518 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.20(7)).
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The court in Deerman observed that "had plaintiff allegedly been
terminated in consequence of her refusal to violate the minimal
requirements of her position as described by the General Assembly
and the Board, a claim for wrongful termination would clearly
lie . .

"133

The court held that plaintiffs termination based on plain-

tiff's statements which "were proffered in fulfillment of her 'teaching
and counseling' obligations as a licensed nurse" constituted a viable
claim under North Carolina's public policy wrongful discharge doctrine. 134 The court concluded that plaintiffs termination by the defendant was "'motivated by [a] . . . reason or purpose that is against
public policy.'"135

In Deerman, the court went on to note that if plaintiff "was terminated for meeting the minimum requirements of the practice of nursing as established and mandated by the NPA and regulations
thereunder, then such termination violated the public policy of this
'136
state to ensure the public a minimum level of safe nursing care.
The court further reasoned that "[t]he public policy recognized herein,
i.e., the protection of public safety and health by ensuring a competent
level of nursing care, is equally as compelling as that acknowledged in
Coman ....
In Caudill v. Dellinger,138 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
concluded that a valid claim for wrongful termination was stated
where the employee was terminated for giving truthful information
about the employer's bank account to the State Bureau of Investigation. 1 39 In this case, the defendant was a district attorney who allegedly fired plaintiff, an administrative assistant, because plaintiff
reported the defendant to the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation for alleged banking and expense account irregularities.1 4 ° Plaintiff presented evidence from which a jury could find that she was
discharged for giving truthful information about defendant's expense
accounts and falsification of bank documents to SBI agents. 4 ' The
court reasoned that "[i]t is the public policy of this state that citizens
133. Id. at 10, 518 S.E.2d at 809.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 11, 518 S.E.2d at 810 (quoting Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc.,
350 N.C. 567, 572, 515 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1999).
136. Id. at 12, 518 S.E.2d at 810.
137. Id. at 12, 518 S.E.2d at 811.
138. 129 N.C. App. 649, 501 S.E.2d 99 (1998), affd, 350 N.C. 89, 511 S.E.2d 304
(1999).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 651, 501 S.E.2d at 99.
141. Id. at 656, 501 S.E.2d at 104.
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cooperate with law enforcement officials in the investigation of
crimes." 142 Under the court's ruling, plaintiffs cooperation with the
protected activity which furthered the public policy of
SBI "was clearly
3
this state.

14

In Roberts v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 1 4 4 the plaintiff
employee alleged that she was terminated for her refusal to act in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-9-505, a provision of the North Carolina
Uniform Commercial Code.145 The employee contended that she was
fired because she refused to cash out a customer's certificate of deposit
without giving the notice required by the statute. 146 The jury awarded
plaintiff $300,000.00 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000.00 in
punitive damages.' 4 7 The court of appeals concluded that North Carolina public policy would have been violated had plaintiff complied with
the employer's instructions.' 48 The North Carolina Supreme Court
granted certiorari;however, the case was settled before the supreme
court heard arguments in the case.
In Vereen v. Holden,14 9 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that the employee stated a viable public policy wrongful discharge
claim where the employee's termination was premised upon his political affiliation and activities. 15 0 The court explained:
In the present case, plaintiff alleges that he was fired by defendants due
to his political affiliation and activities. If true, this would contravene
rights guaranteed by our State Constitution . . .and the prohibition

against political coercion in county employment stated in N.C. Gen.
these actions would
Stat. § 153A-99 (1991). As a result, if proven,
15 1
surely violate North Carolina public policy.

Vereen has broad implications, particularly in public sector cases.
In McMurry v. Cochrane Furniture,152 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the employer where the
employee contended that the employer promised to continue the plaintiffs employment in order to avoid violating federal plant closing regu142.
143.
144.
S.E.2d
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 657, 501 S.E.2d at 104.
Id.
124 N.C. App. 713, 478 S.E.2d 809 (1996), cert. granted, 345 N.C. 346, 483
176 (1997).
Id. at 717, 478 S.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 722, 478 S.E.2d at 815.
Id. at 715, 478 S.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 722, 478 S.E.2d at 815.
121 N.C. App. 779, 468 S.E.2d 471 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 784, 468 S.E.2d at 474.
109 N.C. App. 52, 425 S.E.2d 735 (1993).
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lations. 1 53 The court rejected a separate cause of action for bad faith
discharge and reasoned that "any allegations of bad faith must rise to
the level of the public policy violation."1'5 4
In Tompkins v. Allen,' 5 5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rejection of the bad faith wrongful discharge doctrine and
reasoned that "[w]hile plaintiffs evidence tends to show bad faith, not
to be condoned, such behavior does not rise to the level of a public
policy concern."1'5 6 Tompkins involved a situation in which the
employer temporarily altered inventory records and then used the
altered records as an excuse for the plaintiffs discharge. 1 57 Tompkins
is perhaps the most troubling case rejecting application of the public
policy doctrine in light of the employer's deceitful and egregious
conduct.
In Daniel v. CarolinaSunrock Corporation,1 58 the North Carolina
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a case in which an
employee, who was subpoenaed to testify, was instructed to say no
more than was necessary, and was told by her employer to be sure to
"remember that you work for me and represent me and my company.' 1 5 9 The employee responded that she intended to testify honestly. 160 The employee contended that her relationship with the
employer deteriorated thereafter,16 ' even though the underlying law16 2
suit was settled without the employee ever having to testify.

The employee's public policy wrongful discharge claim was dismissed by the trial court, but the court of appeals reversed, holding for
the plaintiff employee.' 63 Judge Lewis dissented on multiple grounds
from the court of appeals' ruling for the plaintiff, 1 64 and the North
Carolina Supreme Court's ultimate reversal of the decision of the court
of appeals, through its per curiam opinion, was premised upon "the
reasons stated in the dissenting opinion by Judge Lewis.' 1 65 Judge
153. Id.
154. Id. at 55, 425 S.E.2d at 737.

155. 107 N.C. App. 620, 421 S.E.2d 176 (1992).
156. Id. at 623, 421 S.E.2d
157. Id. at 622, 421 S.E.2d

at
at

178.
178.

158. 335 N.C. 233, 436 S.E.2d 835 (1993).
159. Daniel v. Carolina Sunrock Corp., 110 N.C. App. 376, 380, 430 S.E.2d 306, 309
(1993).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 381, 430 S.E.2d at 309.
163. Id. at 381, 430 S.E.2d at 309-310.
164. Id. at 384-85, 430 S.E.2d at 311.
165. 335 N.C. 233, 436 S.E.2d 835 (1993).
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Lewis reasoned that the employer never directly told the employee to
commit perjury, and therefore summary judgment for the plaintiff was
appropriate. 16 6 Judge Lewis further opined that the delay in the termination from the underlying alleged precipitating event and confronta16 7
tion was too tenuous to support a causal connection.
In Rush v. Living Centers-Southeast, Inc.,' 68 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a termination based upon the employee's
refusal to testify at trial did not violate public policy. 169 In Rush, the
plaintiffs employer was involved in a dispute with the spouse of a
deceased patient in regard to an unpaid account. 170 The plaintiff had
previously participated in an ordered arbitration of the dispute in her
capacity as bookkeeper for the defendant.1 7 ' The defendant appealed
the decision of the arbitrator to the superior court; plaintiff was unaware of the appeal and assumed that the case was over. 1 7 2 Almost a
year later, defendant contacted the plaintiff late one afternoon and
instructed her to appear in court the next morning to testify in the
pending case. 1 73 Plaintiff refused the request, stating it was a "complex matter" and she did not have adequate time to prepare her testimony. 1 7 4 The case was then tried without plaintiff's participation.
Plaintiff was then suspended and ultimately terminated on grounds of
5
insubordination.

17

In Rush, plaintiff contended that the termination of her employment violated public policy because she was not subpoenaed and was
therefore not required to appear in court, and that the lack of time to
prepare would have prevented her from giving "'full, fair, and accurate'" testimony. 1 76 The court of appeals concluded that plaintiffs
contention-that defendant's insistence upon plaintiff's participation
might have caused her to perjure herself-was not supported by the
record.1 77 Plaintiff loosely claimed that there was an inference from
the employer to "'do what you have to do. ' 1 78 The court concluded
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

110 N.C. App. at 385, 430 S.E.2d at 311-12.
Id. at 385, 430 S.E.2d at 312.
135 N.C. App. 509, 521 S.E.2d 145 (1999).
Id.
Id. at 510, 521 S.E.2d at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 512, 521 S.E.2d at 147 (quoting plaintiffs deposition).
Id. at 514, 521 S.E.2d at 149.
Id. at 513, 521 S.E.2d at 148 (quoting plaintiffs deposition).
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that a reasonable employee would not have understood the employer's
statements to the plaintiff to be directives that she testify untruthfully,
and therefore that there was no violation of public policy. 179 Rush
seems to be a direct reaffirmation of Daniel v. Carolina Sunrock

Corporation."'o
In Johnson v. Mayo Yarns, Inc.,181 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the termination of an employee for refusing to
remove a confederate flag decal from his tool box did not violate public policy.1 2 In this case, plaintiff was employed as a technician whose
responsibility was to repair textile spinning frames that were used in
the defendant's plant. 18 3 Plaintiff used a tool box, purchased at his
own expense, for performing these repairs.' 8 4 On his tool box, plain85
tiff attached a two by three inch decal of a confederate naval flag.'
Plaintiff was subsequently instructed to remove the flag decal."8 6
Plaintiff refused, was issued a warning for violation of the defendant's
harassment policy, and was ultimately terminated for being in viola8 7
tion of that policy.'
Plaintiff relied upon Lenzer v. Flaherty118 in support of his contention that the North Carolina Constitution can serve as a source of
public policy in a wrongful discharge claim. 18 9 The court of appeals in
Johnson found Lenzer to be distinguishable.19 0 The court concluded
that "plaintiffs conduct carried out in private employment is not constitutionally protected activity. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege
facts sufficient to support a claim of wrongful discharge based on his
activity being protected speech and expression by our
Constitution. "191

In Johnson, the court employed a narrow view of public policy by
failing to apply the Lenzer principle. In Johnson, plaintiff was not
179. Id. at 514, 521 S.E.2d at 148.
180. 335 N.C. 233, 436 S.E.2d 835 (1993).
181. 126 N.C. App. 292, 484 S.E.2d 840 (1997).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 294, 484 S.E.2d 841.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 106 N.C. App. 496 (1992).
189. Johnson, 126 N.C. at 296, 484 S.E.2d at 843.
190. Id. Brewington v. Bedsole, 1993 WL 819885 (May 14, 1993) and Benson v.
McQueen (7:98-CV-164-DE) (Aug. 17, 2000) follow the Lenzer approach rather than
Johnson. Lenzer, Brewington, and Benson provide a more consistent and logical
approach, consistent with Loman.
191. Id. at 297, 484 S.E.2d at 843.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol23/iss2/2

22

McGuinness: North Carolina's Developing Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Doct

20011

NORTH CAROLINA'S DEVELOPING PUBLIC POLICY

225

attempting to litigate a constitutional free speech claim. Rather, he
was merely attempting to use the free speech basis in the North Carolina Constitution as an underlying basis of public policy to support his
claim. Without explanation, the Johnson court implicitly limited
potential use of the North Carolina Constitution as a source of public
policy. Johnson inherently conflicts with the essential point from
Lenzer, which is that the North Carolina Constitution is an actionable
source of public policy. Lenzer and its progeny represent the more
logical position.
D.

The North Carolina Equal Employment PracticesAct

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2, a North Carolina statute that
expressly provides public policy for certain characteristics in the
employment context, provides in pertinent part:
It is the public policy of this State to protect and safeguard the right
and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment
without discrimination or abridgement on account of race, religion,
color, national origin, age, sex or handicap
by employers which regu192
larly employ 15 or more employees.
In Brewer v. CabarrusPlastics, Inc.,' 9 3 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed a trial court's directed verdict for an employer in a
case involving a common law wrongful discharge claim premised upon
the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act "public policy."' 9 4
Brewer arose out of a course of conduct initially involving an alleged
denial of promotion on the basis of race, and which culminated in a
retaliation charge, the plaintiff claiming that the defendant employer
retaliated against the plaintiff for pursuing the initial grievance involv1 95
ing plaintiff's denial of promotion on the basis of discrimination.
Brewer (the plaintiff) initiated EEOC charges but did not file a Title VII
suit. 19 6 Rather, he initiated suit in state court and alleged that he was

fired because of his race and because he had filed an EEOC charge
against his employer. 1 9 7 Brewer alleged causes of action under the
public policy wrongful discharge doctrine and under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.198 Brewer survived summary judgment but after he presented
192. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.1 (1999).
193. 130 N.C. App. 681, 504 S.E.2d 580 (1998). Cf. Hicks v. Robeson County,
1998 WL 1669080 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 1998).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 684, 504 S.E.2d at 583.
198. Id. at 685, 504 S.E.2d at 583.
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his evidence at trial, the trial court granted the employer's motion for a
directed verdict. 19 9 It is implicit that the court of appeals, in reversing
the trial court's ruling for the defendant, concluded that Brewer's retaliatory discharge claim was premised upon the public policy expressed
in the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act. 2 ° °
In Atkins v. USF Dugan, Inc.,20 1 Judge Beatty of the Middle District
of North Carolina held that an employee stated a valid public policy
wrongful discharge claim based upon a termination of the plaintiff
allegedly based on the plaintiffs age and disability.20 2 Atkins reasoned
that the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act was "invoked
merely for the purpose of identifying the expressed public policy of
North Carolina.

' 20 3

Similarly, in Russell v. CarolinaMachine & Associ-

Inc.,2 °4

ates,
the court of appeals affirmed a jury award to a plaintiff
employee for claims of sexual harassment under Title VII and a common law wrongful discharge claim20 5premised upon the North Carolina
Equal Employment Practices Act.

E.

Federal Interpretations

The Fourth Circuit has embraced the North Carolina public policy wrongful discharge doctrine, 206 as have many federal district
courts in North Carolina. 20 7 Federal courts sitting in North Carolina
have further recognized other forms of classic discrimination as violative of public policy including gender, national origin, race, disability
and disability.
In Hughes v. Bedsole,2 °8 Judge Dupree of the Eastern District of
North Carolina recognized a North Carolina common law wrongful
discharge claim where the employee was discharged on the basis of
gender. The employer argued that the common law claim should be
dismissed because she had an adequate remedy in state court under
199. Id.
200. Id. at 685-91, 504 S.E.2d at 583-87.
201. 106 F. Supp. 2d 799 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
202. Id. at 809-10.
203. Id. at 809 n.11.
204. 129 N.C. App. 519, 500 S.E.2d 728 (1998).
205. Id.
206. See Harrison v. Edison Brothers, 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing
doctrine of wrongful discharge based on sexual harassment).
207. See, e.g., Hughes v. Bedsole, 913 F. Supp. 420, 429 (E.D.N.C. 1994), affd, 48
F.3d 1376 (4th Cir. 1995) (gender discrimination as violative of North Carolina public
policy). See also Phillips v. J. P. Stevens, 827 F. Supp. 349 (M.D.N.C. 1993); Iturbe v.
Wandel, 774 F. Supp. 959, 962 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
208. 913 F. Supp. 420 (E.D.N.C. 1994), affd, 48 F.3d 1376 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Title VII. In Hughes, Judge Dupree explained that the North Carolina
Supreme Court held in Amos that public policy is violated when an
employee is fired in contravention of express policy declarations.2 9
Judge Dupree held that the plaintiff had stated a valid common law sex
discrimination claim based on the public policy doctrine.2 10 Judge
Dupree's recognition of gender as actionable public policy represents
the majority position among the federal district courts sitting in North
Carolina. 2 1 ' For example, in Iturbe v. Wandel,212 the court held that a
discharge based on sex or national origin violates the North Carolina
public policy doctrine.2 13
In Williams v. Avnet, Inc. ,214 Judge Boyle of the Eastern District
recognized the application of the North Carolina common law public
policy wrongful discharge doctrine where the underlying matter "con'
cerns disability discrimination. 21
The court further recognized that
"an action for termination in contravention of public policy need not
necessarily be exclusive of other available remedies. 2 16
In Phillips v. J. P. Stevens & Co.,217 Judge Bullock of the Middle
District similarly recognized a public policy claim.2 18 In Phillips, the
plaintiff alleged sexual harassment, sexually discriminatory discharge,
and retaliation. 2 19 After discussing Amos, the Phillips court held that
the public policy expressed in the North Carolina Equal Employment
Practices Act "is essentially identical to the public policy articulated in
Title VII. '' 221 Phillips then went on to categorically reject the preemption doctrine:
Under Amos, the fact that a plaintiff has a remedy under Title VII in no
way diminishes her claim for wrongful discharge. Amos made clear
that the availability of an alternative remedy does not prevent plaintiff
from seeking tort remedies for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.2 2 1
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 429.
Id.
Id.
774 F. Supp. 959, 962 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
Id.
910 F. Supp, 1124 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
Id. at 1137.
Id.
827 F. Supp. 349 (M.D.N.C. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 352.
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In Mumford v. CSX Transportation,2 2 2 Judge Tilley of the Middle
District of North Carolina recognized the public policy wrongful discharge claim where the underlying allegation involved race discrimination. Judge Tilley reasoned that "the public policy of North Carolina22is
3
to protect all persons from discriminatory employment practices."
In Harrison v. Edison Brothers Apparel Stores, Inc.,22 4 the Fourth
Circuit construed North Carolina's doctrine of wrongful discharge and
recognized a common law wrongful discharge claim based on sexual
harassment. 2 5 The plaintiff employee was discharged for refusing to
engage in sexual relations with her supervisor.2 2 6 The allegation constituted classic sexual harassment, which is prohibited by federal and
state public policy. 2 27 The court held that North Carolina's public policy wrongful discharge doctrine was applicable to prohibit sexual
harassment.

228

In Battle v. Perdue,2 2 9 the court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act and the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection
Act provide sources of public policy in which to premise a valid common law wrongful discharge claim. In Mayser v. Protective Agency,
Inc. ,230 the court held that race discrimination was a proper basis for a
North Carolina common law public policy claim. In McKinney v.
Northern Telecom, Inc.,2 3 1 the Middle District held that an employee
who brought suit under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
also stated a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
The court held that the ADEA does not preempt state law actions for
age discrimination: "The common law remedy supplements rather
than hinders the ultimate goal of protecting employees who have been
fired in violation of public policy. '2 32 The court further held that
wrongful discharge claims have not been supplanted by the Equal
Employment Practices Act because it provides no enforceable
remedy.2 3 '
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

878 F. Supp. 827 (M.D.N.C. 1994), affd, 57 F.3d 1066 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 832.
924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 531.
Id.
Id. at 534.
No. 91-68-CIV-2-BO (May 28, 1992).

230. 772 F. Supp. 267, 275-77 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
231. No. 1:91-CV-00426 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 1992).
232. McKinney at 6 (quoting Amos, 416 S.E.2d at 171).

233. Id.
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Thus, a substantial array of federal authority has recognized that
employees may maintain common law public policy wrongful discharge claims premised upon the EEPA.2 3 4 (A number of federal
courts have however refused2 35to extend the common law public policy
claim to retaliation claims.)

F. Actionability of Other Adverse Actions
The public policy wrongful discharge doctrine arose in the context of terminations. However, adverse actions that do not rise to the
level of terminations may similarly frustrate public policy. There have
been very few cases that have considered this issue. There is some
authority suggesting that adverse action other than termination is also
recognized under the public policy doctrine. For example, in Bass v.
City of Wilson,2 36 the Eastern District of North Carolina held that the
failure to hire could constitute a violation of public policy. Similarly,
in Hinson v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,237 the Fourth Circuit cited Bass for the
proposition that the failure to hire in violation of public policy stated a
cause of action.2 38
G.

The Use of Federal Public Policy

Numerous courts have recognized that federal public policy may
properly form the basis for a wrongful discharge claim in state
court. 23 9 In Coman v. Thomas,24 0 which involved violations of federal
234. See e.g., Bannerman v. Burlington, 7 F. Supp. 2d 645 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (age
discrimination); Bradley v. CMI, 17 F. Supp. 2d 491 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (NCEEPA has
been interpreted to permit the common law public policy wrongful discharge action
premised upon gender discrimination); Hicks v. Robeson Co., 1998 WL 1669080
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 1998) (NCEEPA can serve as basis for common law wrongful
discharge claim).
235. See Chung v. BNR, 16 F. Supp. 2d 632 (E.D.N.C. 1997); Mullis v. Mechanics
and Farmers Bank, 994 F. Supp. 680 (M.D.N.C. 1997); Bradley v. CMI, 17 F. Supp. 2d
491 (W.D.N.C. 1998).
236. 835 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.C. 1993). See Lex Larsen, Unjust Dismissal § 6.06, at
6.25 (1994).
237. 61 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 1995).
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Adler v. American Std., 538 F. Supp. 572, 579 (D.C. Md. 1982), affd
in part, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987); Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 799 (6th
Cir. 1985) (ERISA is a source of public policy for wrongful termination claim);
Sherman v. Kraft, 651 N.E.2d 708, 712-23 (111. App. 1995) (public policy tort may be
premised upon federal statutes regulating asbestos in workplace); McNulty v. Borden,
474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270
(W.Va. 1978); Henry H. Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law & Practice § 7.13, at 31 (4th
ed. 1998). Common law wrongful termination tort may "be premised on public
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Department of Transportation regulations and state law, the North
Carolina Supreme Court recognized that "many courts have held that
violations of federal public policy may form the basis for a wrongful
discharge action .... 241

It is also instructive to note that North Carolina Pattern Jury
Instruction (Civil) 640.20 provides the standard jury instruction for
North Carolina common law wrongful termination cases. The instruction provides: "Public policy may include federal as well as state public
policy.

'2 4 2

Both the 1991 and 1996 editions of the Pattern Instruc-

tions stated the law as including federal public policy as a basis for a
wrongful termination claim. Consistent with this fact, Professor Perritt demonstrates in his- treatise that federal law is frequently the
source of public policy in state common law wrongful termination
claims.2 4 3
2 4 4 Judge Tilley, and ultimately
In Mumford v. CSX Transportation,
the Fourth Circuit, held that "North Carolina law relies on federal
authority to establish the standards applicable to state law wrongful
discharge claims. '2 45 A leading example appears in Kilpatrick v. Delaware,2 46 a Pennsylvania case in which the court held that the Occupational Health and Safety Act announces a significant public policy
adequate under Pennsylvania law to bring about a legal claim for
wrongful termination. Another Pennsylvania federal court has enunciated the same principle: "Clearly, Pennsylvania courts allow that federal law may state public policy cognizable in Pennsylvania common
law."

2 47

In 1991, in Leach v. Northern Telecom, Inc.,24 8 Judge Britt of the
Eastern District of North Carolina rejected the proposition that federal
public policy may serve as the basis for a North Carolina common law
policies contained in federal statutes." Professor Perritt demonstrates the broad range
of potential sources of public policy. Id. § 7.11, at 23-28.
240. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
241. Id. at 178, 381 S.E.2d at 449.
242. N.C.P.I. Civil 640.20 n.3 (1997) (emphasis added).
243. Perritt, supra note 244, § 7.13, at 31 (4th ed. 1998). Professor Perritt cites
scores of cases for this proposition. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated, 672 F.2d 1312,
1318 (9th Cir. 1982).
244. 878 F. Supp. 827 (M.D.N.C. 1994), affd, 57 F.3d 1066 (4th Cir. 1995).
245. Id. at 832.
246. 632 F. Supp. 542, 546 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (cited in Coman).
247. Hanson v. Gichner, 831 F. Supp. 403, 407 (M.D. Pa. 1993). See also Martin v.
Luienz, 823 P.2d 100 (Col. 1992) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as public policy).
248. 141 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
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public policy wrongful discharge claim. 24 9 However, Leach was issued
before the Amos 2 50 decision was released by the North Carolina

Supreme Court, in which the court expanded the scope of the public
policy doctrine. 251 Leach was based upon the court of appeals decision in Amos, 252 which was later reversed by the North Carolina

Supreme Court.25 3 Thus, it is important to note that Leach is inconsis-

tent with the North Carolina Supreme Court's analysis in Amos and the
more recent cases.
In Worrell v. Bedsole, 254 an Eastern District of North Carolina case,
the Fourth Circuit court reinstated plaintiffs constitutional free
speech and public policy wrongful discharge claims.255 While the
Fourth Circuit's opinion did not specifically address the underlying
details, the asserted basis for the public policy claim in Worrell was
federal public policy grounded in the North Carolina Constitution.256
Worrell was tried to a $781,400.00 verdict.25 7
In Williams v. Avnet, Inc. ,258 Judge Boyle of the Eastern District of
North Carolina held that "disability discrimination" would violate
public policy for purposes of a public policy wrongful discharge
claim. 259 The disability discrimination in issue included the Americans with Disabilities Act and the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act.260 On summary judgment, the court concluded
that plaintiffs claim failed because the plaintiff did not offer sufficient
evidence to establish her discrimination claim. 2 6 1 It is implicit in the

court's ruling, however, that the ADA may serve as a valid basis of
249. Id.
250. 331 N.C. 348, 416 S.E.2d 166 (1993).
251. Leach was decided in 1991; the North Carolina Supreme Court did not issue a
final ruling in Amos until 1993.
252. 102 N.C. App. 782, 403 S.E.2d 565 (1991), rev'd, 331 N.C. 348, 416 S.E.2d
166 (1993).
253. 331 N.C. 348, 416 S.E.2d 166 (1993).
254. No. 5:94:CV-778-F2 (E.D.N.C.), rev'd and affd in part, 110 F.3d 62, 1997 WL
153830 (4th Cir. Apr. 3 1997). See J. Michael McGuinness, Representing Law
Enforcement Officers In Personnel Disputes and Employment Litigation, 77 Am. Jur.
Trials § 1 (2000) (analyzing Worrell as the model case).
255. Worrell, 110 F.3d. 62, 1997 WL 153830.
256. Id. at *3-5.
257. Id.
258. 910 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
259. Id. at 1137.
260. Id. at 1129.
261. Id. at 1138.
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federal public policy applicable to North Carolina common law wrongful discharge.2 6 2
In Williams, the court observed that "the North Carolina Supreme
Court would 'look to federal decisions for guidance in establishing evidentiary standards and principles of law to be applied in discrimination cases. ' ' 26 This proposition clearly supports the principle that
federal public policy is recognized as a basis for a wrongful discharge
claim. Similarly, North Carolina courts "look to federal
decisions for
26 5
guidance"264 in matters of federal public policy.
In conclusion, the last fifteen years have brought a new era of
common law protection for North Carolina employees where recognized public policy has been violated. In Coman, the employer and its
amici speculated that opening the public policy door would deluge the
courts with floodgates of new litigation. This has not happened.
Rather, a sensible case-by-case fact sensitive approach has emerged.
II.
A.

PROOF OF IMPROPER MOTIVE IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION

The Causation Issue

In employment cases with an intent standard, the prevailing proof
standard typically requires a plaintiff to establish that an improper reason was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate.26 6 Because employers rarely admit any direct considerations of
improper motive, causation is typically established through indirect,
circumstantial, and inferential proof. The link between the improper
motive and the adverse employment action is typically indirect or
circumstantial.
Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc.26 7 is an extremely instructive
North Carolina case addressing causation issues. Brewer observed
that "plaintiffs proper reliance on evidence of the sequence of events
herein raises a factual issue sufficient to preclude grant of a directed
262. Id. at 1130-36.
263. Id. at 1137 (quoting N.C. Department of Correction v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131,
136, 301 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1983)).
264. Curtis v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 40 N.C. App. 475, 479, 537 S.E.2d 498,
501 (2000).

265. See, e.g., N.C. Dept. of Correction v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 136, 301 S.E.2d 78,
82 (1983); Note, Employment Discrimination: Evidentiary Standards in Employment
DiscriminationSuits, 6 Campbell L. Rev. 163 (1984).
266. See, e.g., Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 230, 382 S.E.2d 874,
878 (1989); Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 1994); Laskaris v.
Thornburgh, 733 F.2d 260, 264 (2nd Cir. 1984).
267. 130 N.C. App. 681, 504 S.E.2d 580 (1998).
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verdict. '2 68 Brewer also relied on Abels v. Renfrow Corp.26 9 for the proposition that even "weakness of 'the evidence of causal connection"'
may suffice.2 7 °
This "sequence of events" methodology has been a settled standard in federal constitutional cases. The sequence of events approach
inherently recognizes the typical camouflaged nature of improper
intent. This approach is devoid of a rigid elements test, but considers
logic, common sense, time-sequence of events, and other fact-based
analysis.
The "substantial or motivating factor" test is ordinarily a question
of fact to be decided by the jury.2 7 1 For example, in Hall v. Marion,2 7 2
the Fourth Circuit explained how the causation determination "is a
factual one." Similarly, in Carr v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 27 3 Judge Boyle
of the Eastern District of North Carolina addressed causality as involving "questions of fact and credibility".
The doctrine of inferred intent is most often employed to satisfy
causation in employment termination cases.2 7 4 In the leading case of
Anthony v. Sundlun,2 7 5 the court explained:
[w]hat an actor says is not conclusive on a state-of-mind issue. Notwithstanding a person's disclaimers, a contrary state of mind may be
inferred from what he does and from a factual mosaic tending to show
that he really meant to accomplish that which he professes not to have
intended.2 7 6
A finding of improper intent is certainly not limited to instances
where decision-makers openly articulate some bad purpose. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist has explained: "There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes. '2 77 Invidious discrimi268. Id. at 691, 504 S.E.2d at 587 (emphasis added).
269. 335 N.C. 209, 436 S.E.2d 822 (1993).
270. 130 N.C. App. at 690-91, 504 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting Abels, 335 N.C. 209, 216,
436 S.E.2d 822, 826).
271. See Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 436 S.E.2d 822 (1993); Roberts v. Van
Buren Pub. Sch., 773 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1985).
272. 31 F.3d 183, 192 (4th Cir. 1994).
273. 883 F. Supp. 10, 16 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
274. See e.g., Rokovich v. Wade, 819 F.2d 1393, 1398 (7th Cir. 1987) (proof of
actual intent to retaliate against employee for exercise of constitutional rights not
required; jury allowed to examine totality of evidence and to "infer a retaliatory
motive.").
275. 952 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1992).
276. Id. at 606.
277. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (direct evidence of
improper intent is not required). See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc.,
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natory or improper intent "may often be inferred from the totality of
the relevant facts.

B.

2 78

North Carolina'sEmployment Causation Rule: Abels v. Renfro
Corporation

In Abels v. Renfro Corp.,279 the North Carolina Supreme Court
addressed the causation issue in wrongful termination litigation. Abels
involved the plaintiff's termination that occurred allegedly because
plaintiff was believed to be about to file a worker's compensation
claim.

28 0

Plaintiff had been employed as a knitter by the defendant for many
years prior to her discharge in 1987.281 Plaintiff alleged that she had
been injured in June, 1984.282 Plaintiff alleged that she reported that
injury but did not file a worker's compensation claim at that time.28 3
Plaintiff alleged a second injury that occurred in June, 1987.284 Defendant discharged the plaintiff on August 19, 1987.2' Approximately
six weeks after her termination, plaintiff filed worker's compensation
claims for her June 1984 and June 1987 injuries.28 6
Plaintiff alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for her
anticipated filing of worker's compensation claims.2 8 7 The employer
contended that plaintiff was fired due to the poor quality of plaintiff's
work, and that prior to her discharge, plaintiff received several warnings from management to either improve the quality of her work or be
terminated. 288 The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor for
$82,200 in damages.2 8 9 On appeal, the employer challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.2 9 °
530 U.S. 133 (2000). See Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 264 (1st
Cir. 1987).
278. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
279. 335 N.C. 209, 436 S.E.2d 822 (1993).
280. Id. at 213, 436 S.E.2d at 824.
281. Id. at 212, 436 S.E.2d at 824.
282. Id. at 213, 436 S.E.2d at 824.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 214, 436 S.E.2d at 825.
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Plaintiff testified that she had good production throughout her
period of employment. 2 9 ' There was evidence that the plaintiff was
allowed to engage in light work following her first injury, that the
defendant employer was aware that she had been injured again in 1987
while at work, and that her doctor had requested that plaintiff be given
a one month leave of absence.2 9 2 Shortly after her second injury,
plaintiff was discharged.29 3 The court explained:
We conclude that, although the evidence of causal connection between
the discharge and the filing of the worker's compensation claim is
weak, the jury could have inferred that [the defendant employer] having earlier escaped a worker's compensation claim by allowing plaintiff
to continue earning her salary at lighter duties, eventually concluded,
upon her second injury, that this prospect was no longer to be avoided
and that, in order to forestall the anticipated filing of a worker's compensation claim, the most expedient remedy would be to discharge
plaintiff. We thus hold that there was sufficient evidence to support an
inference that plaintiff was fired because Defendant Renfro Corporation anticipated her good-faith filing of a worker's compensation
claim . *294
In Abels, the jury was able to examine all of the evidence and draw
the inference of causal connection between the termination and an
anticipated filing of a worker's compensation claim. The court in
Abels later addressed the issues of motivation in wrongful termination
cases.2 9 5 The court explained:
In a case such as this, the motivation of the employer in the dismissal
of the employee is the primary issue to be decided by the jury. It is
unlikely that either plaintiff or defendant will be able to present any
direct evidence of the employer's state of mind in the making of the
decision. Thus, critical to this determination would be evidence of
how the employer has treated similarly situated employees in the past
and how it was treating them at the time of the disputed discharge.
This evidence, though circumstantial in nature, is perhaps the best
indication, other than testimony of the parties themselves, of the rationale of the employer for the discharge.29 6
Because of the sparse number of North Carolina cases directly
addressing the causation issue, reference to federal and other cases
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 216, 436 S.E.2d at 826.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 218, 436 S.E.2d at 827.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2001

33

236

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:203

may be necessary to find persuasive analysis in addressing causation
and standard of proof issues.
For example, providing additional guidance in North Carolina
public policy cases is in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,29 7 in which
the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the standard of proof
framework for employment discrimination cases. In Hicks, the Court
held that "the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case,
suffice to show intentional discrimination."' 2 98 The Supreme Court, in
essence, observed that "when presented with sufficient evidence to
find both that the plaintiff has made a prima facie case and that the
employer's pro-offered non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged
actions were not credible, the fact finder can properly find that the
defendant employer has intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."'2 99 The Court explained: "rejection of the defendant's proffered

reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination," and "upon such rejection, '[n]o additional
proof of discrimination is required.' ' 30 0 The Court concluded that
"[riejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to
sustain a finding of discrimination ....
In Carringtonv. Hunt,3 °2 Judge Britt of the Eastern District issued
a substantial opinion addressing the causation issue in a public
employee free speech case. Judge Britt's analysis demonstrates how
imperative it is to afford an employee "the benefit of all conflicting
inferences considered" in deciding causation on summary judgment. 30 3 Judge Britt sifted through the contentions and concluded that

"the resolution of a question of intent often depends upon the credibil297. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000) (in which the Court analyzed proof standards and burdens under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act; the Court reaffirmed its holding and analysis in
St. Mary's v. Hicks. In Reeves, the Court stated: "Proof that the defendant's explanation
is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination ....

[T]he trier of fact can reasonably infer

from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 134.
298. 509 U.S. at 511.
299. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
300. Hicks at 511 (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)) (citations omitted).
301. Id. n.4.
302. No. 5:94-CV-324-BR2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 1995).
303. Id.
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ity of the witness, which can best be determined by the trier of fact
after observing the demeanor of the witnesses during direct and cross
examination. ' 30 4 In denying summary judgment,30 5 Judge Britt
observed that the plaintiff raised sufficient evidence to support a credible argument that the defendant's purported justification for dismissing the plaintiff may have been a pretextual argument conceived
after the initiation of the lawsuit.30 6
Close Temporal Proximity May Demonstrate Nexus
Several federal cases have held that close proximity in time
between the protected conduct and the adverse action creates a presumption and prima facie case of retaliation.30 7 These cases establish
that temporal proximity alone, especially if the protected conduct is
particularly close to the adverse action, is a primary factor militating
in favor of a jury question on the issue of causation.
The authoritative treatise by Retired Judge George Pratt of the Second Circuit and Professor Martin Schwartz states the general rule:
"Proof that exercise of protected expression was a substantial and
motivating factor can be shown by close proximity in time between the
exercised First Amendment rights and retaliatory action."30 8 This rule
is supported by scores of cases.3 0 9 These cases represent the backbone
of causation law in the employment context.
C.

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., DeCinto v. Westchester Co. Med. Ctr, 821 F.2d 111 (2nd Cir. 1987)
(adverse action taken within one year creates presumption of retaliation); Walsdorf v.
Board of Comm'rs, 857 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1988) (adverse action within seven months
creates inference of retaliation); Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708 (11th
Cir. 1992).
308. See 1 George Pratt & Martin Schwartz, Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation
642-43 (1996).
309. See Stever v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 943 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1991) (close
proximity in time between last complaint of teacher and retaliatory transfer shows
causal connection; suspicious sequence of events is one factor to consider); Holland v.
Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1315 (7th Cir. 1989) (close temporal
proximity can show causal connection); Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104 (1st Cir.
1991) (circumstantial evidence indicated superior was aware of complaint made by
employee; adverse action taken shortly thereafter; causal connection shown);
Schwartzman v. Valenzuela, 846 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1988) (close proximity in
time between exercise of First Amendment rights and firing creates inference that
firing related to speech; conduct deficiencies did not arise until after speech infers
retaliation); Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1987) (close proximity in
time between public criticism and adverse action creates inference of retaliation),
amended by 828 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1987); Davis v. State Univ. of New York, 802 F.2d
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Adverse action within nine months of protected activity has been
held to provide enough evidence of an inference of retaliation 1 °
"That an employee can provide an organization with 24 years of service and then be summarily discharged without a hearing or even a
day's notice is powerful evidence that Defendant may have had questionable motives."3 1 ' Judge Pratt and Professor Schwartz explained
that a "plaintiff can also show causal connection by differential treatment of other similarly situated, by showing that non-retaliatory reasons is a pretext or sham or by direct statements of animosity by
employer based on statements of public concern.

3 12

D. The Arlington Heights Test
In the leading case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
3 13 the United States Supreme Court
Housing Development Corporation,
identified several factors to be examined to determine whether discriminatory intent or purpose is present. Those factors are:
3 14
(1) The impact of the decision/action;
(2) The historical background of the decision, particularly
if it reveals
3 15
a series of actions taken for invidious purposes; 3 16
the decision;
(3) The sequence of events leading up to
3 17
procedure;
normal
from
(4) Departures
3 18
(5) Departures from normal substantive criteria;
3 19
history;
administrative
or
(6) The legislative
(7) Contemporaneous statements by members of the decision-making
body. 320
638, 642 (2nd Cir. 1986) (prima facie case made out by plaintiff showing that she
engaged in protected conduct, that the employer was aware of such conduct, and
adverse employment action "closely followed" the protected conduct); Collins v.
Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 704 (7th Cir. 1987) (transfer of the plaintiff employee within
five weeks of making a complaint was held to constitute a prima facie case of
retaliation); Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708 (11th Cir. 1992) (employee
fired six months after giving testimony before a board of inquiry was held to entitle the
jury to infer the requisite causal connection).
310. Dancy v. Am. Red Cross, 972 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1997).
311. Id. at 5.
312. 1 George Pratt & Martin Schwartz, Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation (citing
Clements v. Airport Authority, 69 F.3d 321, 335 (9th Cir. 1995) and other cases).
313. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
314. Id. at 266.
315. Id. at 267.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 268.
320. Id.
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In Arlington Heights, the Court stated: "Determining whether
invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available." 3 2 ' A finding of improper intent is certainly not
limited to instances where decision-makers articulate some bad purpose. "If proof of a civil right[s] violation depends on an open statement by an official

. .

., the Fourteenth Amendment offers little solace
3 22

to those seeking its protection.
In Smith v. Town of Clarkton,3 23 the Fourth Circuit recognized that
statements revealing improper intent are often "camouflaged. '3 24 As
Chief Justice Rehnquist has explained: "There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes. ' 32 5 Invidious
discriminatory or improper intent "may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts .... "326 The United States Supreme Court
has held that one need not submit "direct evidence of discriminatory
intent."32 7 Finally, it is not necessary to prove that the challenged
employment decision rested solely on an improper or discriminatory
purpose. 328 However, it must be established that an improper or discriminatory purpose has been one of the motivating factors involved,
but it need not be the dominant or primary purpose.3 2 9 While the
case law has somewhat eased the technical burden in proving intent,
practical proof of improper intent is often difficult to capture. Fowler
v. Smith 3 30 demonstrates the essence of the causation principle:
[D]irect evidence in proving illegitimate intent is not required to avoid
summary judgment in unconstitutional retaliation claims; circumstantial evidence will suffice ....
We recognize that direct evidence of
improper motive is usually difficult, if not impossible, to obtain and
requiring direct evidence would effectively insulate from suit public
officials who deny an improper motive ....
321. Id. at 266.
322. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970).
323. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).
324. Id. at 1066.
325. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (direct evidence
of improper intent is not required); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000). See also Kercado v. Aponte-Rogue, 829 F.2d 255, 264 (1st Cir. 1987).
326. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
327. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717.
328. Arlington, 429 U.S. at 266.

329. Id.
330. 68 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1995).
331. Id. at 127 (citation omitted).
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Factors Demonstrating Improper Motive and Causation

The following have been relied upon as a basis for a sufficient
332
inference of a retaliatory or improper motive:
(1) Decisionmaker's attitude regarding the conduct of the individual
33 3
or employee. A hostile attitude suggests an improper motive.
(2) Disparate treatment, particularly unequal discipline among
employees or individuals.3 3 4
(3) Reduced employee evaluations after engaging in protected
conduct.
(4) Manner, tone and language of how the individual is informed of
the deprivation.
(5) Inadequate investigation of allegations surrounding the adverse
action. Failing to review and consider all3 facts
purportedly in the
35
individual's favor suggests arbitrariness.
(6) Deviations from routine procedures.
(7) Lack of reasonable warnings or notice of alleged violation or
noncompliance.
(8) Temporal proximity. Timing of the adverse action following
engagement in protected activity.3 3 6
(9) The magnitude of the alleged offense. Comparisons of punishment showing that the employee has been more harshly punished
than others suggests an improper motive.
(10) History of employee's work performance. A drastic alleged
decline in performance is suspect.
(11) Investigation or scrutiny of employee's conduct following protected conduct.
(12) The employer's creation of the problem that is supposedly the
basis for the employer's criticism of the employee.
337
(13) Subjectivity in termination or rejection criteria.
(14) Pretext (proof that the articulated reason is not the true reason).
332. See, e.g., Jim Causley Pontiac v. N.L.R.B., 620 F.2d 122, 125 (6th Cir. 1980);
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980); Lewis Grocer Co. v.
Holloway, 874 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1989). See also Russell L. Wald, Retaliatory
Termination of Private Employment, 7 POF2d 1 (1975); 1 Kent Spriggs, Representing
Plaintiffs in Title VII Actions § 5.15 (1994).
333. See Jetstream AERO Serv., Inc. v. New Hanover County, No. 88-1748, 1989 WL
100644 (4th Cir. August 15, 1989).
334. Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1984). See generally
Krieger v. Gold Bond Bldg. Prod., 863 F.2d 1091 (2nd Cir. 1988); Ramsuer v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460 (2nd Cir. 1989).
335. See Martinez v. El Paso County, 710 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir. 1983).
336. Warren v. Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d 746, 758 (4th Cir. 1986).
337. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); Warren v.
Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1987); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th
Cir. 1976).
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(15) Employee's lack of history of the alleged basis of termination.
(16) Changed grounds for the adverse action.3 3 8
(17) Employer's failure to adhere to its own procedural or substantive
policies or regulations.
(18) Undue delay in processing applications.
(19) Changes in the course of dealings among the parties.
(20) Changes in qualifications or rules after commencement of selection process.
3 39
(21) A secret paper trail, without notice to the employee.
(22) Delayed articulation of alleged justification.34 °
Many other cases provide various means of inferring causation. 3 4 '
In Carrv. F.W. Woolworth Co.,3 42 Judge Boyle of the Eastern District of
North Carolina addressed causality as involving "questions of fact and
credibility."3 4 3 Judge Boyle observed how the plaintiffs evidence of
retaliation was based on plaintiffs testimony that the employer's "atti338. Changed asserted grounds for termination are among the most telling factors
ascertaining pretext. 1 Kent Spriggs, Representing Plaintiffs in Title VII Actions
§ 19.24 (1994). For example, in Schmitz v. St. Regis Paper Co., 811 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.
1988), one court was confronted with a similar situation where one reason was
initially given to the company officer, another reason was given to an administrative
agency and yet a much more sophisticated reason was offered at trial. Cf. Sweat v.
Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing summary judgment due
to the indicia of pretext where differing accounts of the reasons for the termination
were in record).
339. See Harris v. Richards Mfg. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1193 (W.D. Tenn. 1981).
340. Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991) (four month delay was
evidence of pretext).
See, e.g., Ratliff v. Wellington Exempted Vill. Sch. Bd., 820 F.2d 792, 796 (6th Cir.
1987) (relying upon post-speech job criticism and post-speech vindictiveness as
inference of improper motive; verdict affirmed); Ware v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 492,
881 F.2d 906, 911-912 (10th Cir. 1989) (relying upon proof of body language and
other non-verbal conduct as evidence of causation); Morro v. City of Birmingham, 117
F.3d 508 (11th Cir. 1997) (proof of causation was based on the chronology of events;
verdict affirmed); Stever v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 943 F.2d 845, 851-52 (8th Cir.
1991) (sequence of events and timing and order of events raises inference of retaliatory
motive); Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 713 (11th Cir. 1992).
341. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Wellington Exempted Vill. Sch. Bd., 820 F.2d 792, 796 (6th

Cir. 1987) (relying upon post-speech job criticism and post-speech vindictiveness as
inference of improper motive; verdict affirmed); Ware v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 492,
881 F.2d 906, 911-912 (10th Cir. 1989) (relying upon proof of body language and
other non-verbal conduct as evidence of causation); Morro v. City of Birmingham, 117
F.3d 508 (11th Cir. 1997) (proof of causation was based on the chronology of events;
verdict affirmed); Stever v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 943 F.2d 845, 851-52 (8th Cir.
1991) (sequence of events and timing and order of events raises inference of retaliatory
motive); Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 713 (11th Cir. 1992).
342. 883 F. Supp. 10, 16 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
343. Id. at 16.
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tude towards her changed substantially" after the employer learned of
the protected activity.3 4 4
Recent speech cases confirm the general rule: "causation is an
issue which must be decided by the jury. '345 Adequate proof of causation "includes the sequence of events. '34 6 Providing false information

may provide an inference of intentional discrimination.3 4 7 In Perdomo
v. Browner,3 48

the Seventh Circuit explained that "a fact-finder may

infer intentional
ness

.

discrimination

from an employer's untruthful-

. "349

In Ware v. Unified School District No. 492,35° the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision setting aside an employee's verdict after the employee was discharged for speaking out on a school
bond issue. In this case, the court rejected the district court's conclusion that the employee's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law
because it was subjective. 3 5 ' The court stated: "Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences ... will necessarily involve subjective
elements." 3 52 The court went on to explain that "[a] plaintiff may cre-

ate a reasonable inference of improper motivation by presenting evidence tending to show that the reasons proffered for the adverse action
353
are without factual support.1
The plaintiff in Ware was able to refute the employer's allegations
that the plaintiff had caused a deteriorating office environment, that
she was losing interest in her job, and that plaintiff resented change,
among other allegations.3 5 4 The parties hashed it out and the jury was
allowed to rely upon the following: "The evidence presented by both
sides consisted largely of subjective evaluations of body language, tone
of voice, facial expressions, the nature of the office atmosphere, and
3 55
other inferences drawn from non-verbal conduct."
344. Id.
345. Hadad v. Croucher, 970 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
346. Id.; Matulin v. Village of Lodi, 862 F.2d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 1988) ("causation is
an issue of fact which must be decided by the jury"; court may rely on "sequence of
events" as sufficient proof).
347. Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140 (7th Cir. 1995).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 145.
350. 881 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1989).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 912.
353. Id. at 911.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 912.
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A number of cases demonstrate how employment cases are frequently proven with circumstantial evidence and inferences. In Duke
v. Uniroyal Inc. ,356 the Fourth Circuit reviewed an age discrimination
verdict. The defendant employer raised numerous issues on appeal,
including an argument that the verdict was unsupported by sufficient
evidence. 357 Duke involved the trial of the termination of two employees, Duke and Fox. 35 8 The employer contended that it terminated
Duke because his sales territory was eliminated. 359 The employer contended that Fox was terminated because of his weakness in knowledge
of the products that the employer had decided to promote, as well as an
inability to promote them. 360 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the
plaintiffs' burden of proof "may be satisfied, as with any other case, by
direct or circumstantial evidence."3 6 1
The Fourth Circuit concluded in Duke that the evidence presented
was such that a reasonable jury could find that the employer's articulated reasons were pretextual. 362 As a basis for its conclusion, and as a
part of reviewing the evidence, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the fact
that the employer "did not fully follow its own EEO policy .... 363 In
Duke, the Fourth Circuit also noted and relied upon the fact that the
plaintiffs' work performance was favorable.3 6 4 The Fourth Circuit further relied upon the fact that some of the relevant documents relating
to the employees were developed within the termination period.3 65
The Fourth Circuit also found as relevant that a memorandum was
developed just two weeks before Mr. Fox was fired.3 6 6
I . The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the evidence in Duke underscores
the approach that courts have historically taken in reviewing insufficiency contentions in employment termination cases based upon what
are often various types of circumstantial evidence. The evidence must
be carefully gleaned in its totality with a view toward examining circumstances which give inferences.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1415.
Id.
Id. at 1416-17.
Id. at 1417.
Id. at 1417.
Id. at 1419.
Id. at 1418.
Id. at 1419.
Id.
Id.
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In Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc.,367 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a jury
verdict in favor of a plaintiff in an employment termination case. In
Deloach, the plaintiff employee had been an employee for some twentyeight years before his termination. 368 Deloach was ostensibly terminated for ineffective job performance. 3 69 The employer also claimed
that "his employees were losing confidence in him because he was not
responsive to their complaints and that he was unable to discipline
managers who did not keep clean, well-stocked stores."3 7 °
To show that the employer's reasons were pretextual, plaintiff
demonstrated "several irregularities in the circumstances regarding his
discharge. '3 71 Deloach offered evidence that certain reports were not
properly written, and that he was required to sign one of the reports
without being provided an opportunity to read it, that he was not
aware that his job was in danger at the time he was discharged.3 7 2
In Deloach, the court further observed that the employer did not
have any documentation that the employer discussed the additional
claims with Deloach.3 7 3 This observation of the lack of documentation is a common piece of circumstantial evidence in employment termination cases. In Deloach, the court further pointed out how there
were "inconsistencies in the testimony" of the employer.3 7 4 Again,
inconsistent testimony is perhaps among the leading type of circumstantial evidence which is used to establish improper motive in
employment termination cases.
In Morro v. City of Birmingham,375 the Third Circuit affirmed a
jury verdict in favor of a law enforcement officer who brought, an
action challenging his suspension on First Amendment grounds. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee for $150,000.376
Among other issues on appeal, the city argued that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. 3 77 "Morro's proof of causation was based solely on the chronology of events". 3 78 The court

observed that:
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

897 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 817.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id.

373. Id.
374. Id. at 820.

375. 117 F.3d 508 (11th Cir. 1997).
376. Id. at 512.
377. Id. at 516.
378. Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
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In view of the entire record, a reasonable juror could have inferred that
the Chief was motivated to act against Morro by a desire to punish his
First Amendment activity that tended
to reflect unfavorably upon the
3 79
mayor, his daughter, or the Chief.
Morro underscores the long line of settled cases that the entire
record of evidence should be gleaned for any inference of improper
motivation. If there is any such inference, the verdict must stand.3 80
Several contemporary employment termination cases reject the notion
of hypertechnical review of jury verdicts on issues of sufficiency of

evidence.3 8
In Harringtonv. Harris,3" 2 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a verdict in
an employment case. In Harrington, the court held that "'a jury may
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and those inferences
may constitute sufficient proof to support a verdict."' 3 83 In Harrington, the court explained how a plaintiff may demonstrate pretext either
by showing that an improper motive more likely motivated the
employer, or that the employer's explanation is unworthy of
credence. 38 4 The court in Harrington affirmed the verdict despite
the fact that the evidence offered by plaintiffs was purely
circumstantial.3 85
In National Labor Relations Act cases, the National Labor Relations Board has looked to several considerations in determining
whether adverse action was taken in retaliation for the employee's protected activity. These include:
(1') the employer's knowledge of the protected activity;
(2) employer animus, showing hostility or resentment;

(3) timing;
(4) shifting, as opposed to consistent, employer justifications;
38 6
(5) disparate, inconsistent treatment in adverse action.
Cases under the National Labor Relations Act have been historically relied upon in other employee discharge cases for guidance in
determining the difficult issues of motivation and causation. For
example, in order to establish a case of wrongful discharge under sec379. Id. at 517.
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 118 F.3d" 1125 (7th Cir. 1997);
Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the
imputation of discriminatory intent).
382. 118 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 1997).
383. Id. at 367 (quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
384. Id. at 367-68.
385. Id. at 368.
386. See Labor and Employment Law Basics 26 (1993).
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tion 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, it must be shown that
the employee was engaged in protected activity, that the employer was
aware of the activity, and that the activity was a substantial or motivating reason for the employer's adverse action.38 7 In NLRB v. Grand Canyon Mining Co. ,388 the Fourth Circuit explained:
The Board may infer discriminatory motive from either direct or circumstantial evidence. Since motive is a factual question, we must
accept the board's finding as long as the finding is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole,
even though we would inde3 89
pendently decide the issue differently.
In Grand Canyon, the Fourth Circuit observed how the temporal
proximity issue is most important. 390 The Fourth Circuit observed
how the timing of the transfer in issue supported the board's conclu39 1
sion of unlawful motive.
The lack of North Carolina cases addressing causation and
improper motive will likely lead to further application of the principles
recognized in federal cases.
III.

CONCLUSION

Since its birth in Sides v. Duke Hospital fifteen years ago, North
Carolina's public policy wrongful discharge doctrine has evolved into
meaningful protection for employees whose conduct falls within a clear
ambit of some defined public policy. Although the North Carolina
appellate courts have retreated from the recognition of a separate bad
faith cause of action, a number of the recent public policy cases reveal
a reasonable reach of the doctrine. Probably the safest characterization of the fifteen years of subsequent appellate decisions is that of a
"mixed bag."
When the public policy violation is established and causally connected to adverse employment action, North Carolina has recognized
and applied the public policy doctrine in several different contexts.
The doctrine is one of general application to all employers. Because of
demonstrated employer misconduct in numerous proven cases in
which there is no specific meaningful statutory remedy, this doctrine
has become a critically necessary component of North Carolina
employment law.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
lay-off

See FPC Holdings, Inc. v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 935, 942 (4th Cir. 1995).
116 F.3d 1039 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1047 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1048.
Id. (citing FPC Holdings, 64 F.3d at 943-44, and holding that the timing of the
in question raised the inference that anti-union animus motivated the lay-offs).
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The cases since Sides, Coman, and Amos provide little structured
doctrinal guidance for ready application to the next case. It appears
that there is some recognition of a subjective sliding scale depending
upon the egregiousness of the underlying facts of each case. However,
few principled lines exist for consistent reapplication. It appears that
the public policy doctrine will continue to travel along these uncertain
paths. The public policy cases are left to be decided on a case by case
basis

"matur[ing]

slowly",3 9 2

as

the Supreme

Court

in Amos

instructed. The doctrine remains as a meaningful step toward workplace justice and ensures compliance with statutes that are otherwise
not directly enforceable.

392. Amos, 331 N.C. at 351, 416 S.E.2d at 168 n.1.
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